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This paper reconsiders a long-held view that democracy is a hindrance to 
economic development, at least in its early stages, and, further, that   
authoritarianism works better than democracy, because it allows the state 
to mobilize more effectively the resources necessary for industrial take-off. 
The different experiences of India and China would appear to reinforce 
this conventional wisdom. The Economist sums it up thus: “A proudly 
democratic India that grows at 6% a year … should be congratulated for 
having succeeded better than a brutal anti-democratic China which grows 
at 10% a year.” I suggest reasons to be sceptical of this view, and argue, to 
the contrary, that democracy will, in the medium to longer run, promote, 
rather, than retard, economic development, and predict that the future 
experiences of India and China may bear this out. This is quite apart from 
the philosophical consideration that democracy and liberty are intrinsic, 
not merely instrumental, to the process of development. 
 
One line of reasoning rests on the classical liberal dictum, best enunciated 
in the last century by Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, that 
economic freedom and political freedom are inextricably linked. China’s 
pursuit of a free market, without a free society, sets up contradictory forces 
that will eventually lead, either to slow and painful democratization, or, 
more likely, a sudden political implosion, which will, obviously, set back 
economic development. In India’s case, democracy serves as a safety valve, 
through which putative losers of reform can make their voices heard. The 
paper considers debates around the 2004 general election, in particular, 
whether it could be considered a vote against further economic reform by 
those left out, especially the rural poor, or whether merely an anti-
incumbency vote. I conclude, after sifting the evidence, that there is, 
indeed, a case that the defeat of the BJP-led NDA government and the 
electoral success of the Congress-led UPA government rested on the 
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former’s triumphalist “India Shining” campaign and the latter’s appeal to 
“aam admi” (the common man). 
 
To clinch the analysis, I argue that the pursuit of a more gradual and 
nuanced approach to further reforms, so-called “second” and “third” 
generation reforms, such as labour law reform, disinvestment, financial 
sector reform, removal of agricultural subsidies, etc., can be crafted in a 
manner to be politically feasible, under the twin rubrics of “inclusive 
liberalization” and “optimal globalization”. This is a critical challenge in 
the context of a still largely poor, democratic polity, such as India, in which 
the political centre of gravity is, perforce, to the left. This is the question of 
the moment in India, as it is in other large and democratic emerging 
economies, such as Brazil, Mexico, or South Africa, in which the 
imperative is to build a politically durable consensus around such next 
generation reforms. The paper outlines avenues that would make this 
possible, including gradualist and sequenced reforms centred around 
public-private partnerships (PPPs), especially in the infrastructure sector, 
selective expansion of special economic zones (SEZs) on non-agricultural 
land, income support to farmers to replace protection lost through trade 
and subsidy liberalization, and, perhaps most importantly, firmly 
establishing in the public eye the trade-employment link by promoting 
and nurturing small-scale producers in selected exportable sectors in 
underprivileged regions. If these succeed in allowing reforms to proceed, 
incrementally if not apace, this will vindicate my contention that, in the 
long run, democracy is a friend, and not a foe, of economic development. 
 




This paper represents the first fruits of my reflections on the political 
economy of economic liberalization and reform in the context of India, and 
in light of the old social science debate captured in the title. As such, it 
draws on conversations and debates I have had on this and related subjects 
over the course of many years, and it would be impossible to acknowledge 
all of my accrued intellectual debts. I would, however, like to name a few 
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here: the usual disclaimer applies a fortiori to a subject such as this. In that 
spirit, then, I thank: Mani Shankar Aiyar, Jagdish Bhagwati, Alessandra 
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This paper reconsiders a long-held view that democracy is a hindrance to 
economic development, at least in its early stages, and, further, that   
authoritarianism works better than democracy, because it allows the state 
to mobilize more effectively the resources necessary for industrial take-off. 
This suggests that there may be a trade-off between democracy and 
development. The possibility was first posed in the literature by the 
economist Jagdish Bhagwati, when, in 1966, he wrote of “the cruel choice 
between rapid (self-sustained) expansion and democratic processes” 
(Bhagwati, 1966, p. 204), and was further amplified by the political scientist 
Atul Kohli (1986), who, paraphrasing Bhagwati, dubbed this the “cruel 
dilemma” thesis. The traditional view is based on a particular theory of 
economic development, prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, in which 
development is driven by capital accumulation. The locus classicus of this 
approach is the Harrod-Domar growth model, although it appears in 
much earlier work by Johann von Neumann, the somewhat later 
Mahalanobis model, and more recent work in “endogenous” growth 
theory by economists Paul Romer, Robert Lucas, and others. In this 
approach, economic growth is a function both of an economy’s rate of 
saving and investment (the two necessarily being equal in a closed 
economy) and of the productivity of investment, captured by the 
incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR).1 Since the ICOR was generally 
taken as a datum, it followed that policy could operate only by attempting 
to raise an economy’s rate of saving and investment. It was self-evident 
that an authoritarian regime would be in a better position to do this than a 
democratic one, in which high “enforced” public saving, through higher 
taxes, would be unpopular with voters and hence unlikely to be pursued. 
Another early development model, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan’s “big push” 
theory, in which an economy could only escape a low-level poverty trap 
by several coordinated large scale investments, also pointed in the 
direction of concerted action by the state, which again would be more 
feasible to implement in an authoritarian than a democratic state. 
 
The success of the East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs), the 
so-called “four dragons”, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South 
Korea, which developed rapidly under authoritarian regimes in the 1960s 
                                                 
1 Formally, in the Harrod-Domar model, g = s/v, where g is the growth rate of output, s is the 
savings (and investment) rate, and v is the ICOR. 
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and 1970s, seemed to vindicate this conventional view, although the 
dismal failure of the Soviet Union and its satellite states to do so, and the 
eventual unraveling of the Soviet-type system, obviously raised questions 
about the apparent nexus between authoritarianism and development.  
This could be explained away to some extent, by arguing that the former 
were characterized by far greater productivity of investment than the 
latter, something which, as noted, had been taken as a datum in the 
Harrod-Domar-type approach. There were even cultural theories based on 
the success of the NICs, a version of which has been called the “Asian 
values” thesis, propounded by, amongst others, Lee Kuan Yew, long-
serving Prime Minister and currently Minister Mentor of Singapore. In 
1994, for instance, Lee was cited thus by the Economist (August 27th, 1994): 
“I believe what a country needs to develop is discipline more than 
democracy. The exuberance of democracy leads to indiscipline and 
disorderly conduct which are inimical to development.” This is an elegant 
summary of what remains to this day the orthodox defence of 
authoritarian political regimes in developing countries, most notably, 
China and its ruling Communist Party. 
 
There is a further refinement of this traditional view, which has to do with 
the sequencing of democratization and free market reforms in formerly 
Communist countries. The conventional view is that Russia’s failure in the 
1990s resulted from putting glasnost (opening up) before perestroika 
(restructuring), whereas Chinese success stemmed from pursuing 
economic reforms under an authoritarian political system. Again, to cite 
Lee, this is what saved China from a political implosion. On this more 
nuanced view, democracy must follow economic development, not the 
other way around, and becomes possible when a country reaches a certain 
level of development at which it can afford the “luxury” of democratic 
institutions. This view rests both on the “cruel dilemma” thesis, already 
mentioned, as well as the theory that, as economic development proceeds 
apace, there will be forces within a society that clamour for democratic 
reforms and greater political liberty. To put it in somewhat banal economic 
terms, democracy is a “normal” good, and, when a society’s income is high 
enough, people will demand it as a matter of course, just as they demand 
fine wine and designer clothes. 
 
In recent years, there has been considerable debate on the merits of this 
conventional view, with an increasing number of writers, whether 
economists, political scientists, policy analysts, or journalists, questioning 
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the legitimacy of the “cruel dilemma” and the concomitant sequencing of 
free markets and a free society. In a prescient essay, published in the Indian 
Economic Review in 1995, and based on his Rajiv Gandhi Golden Jubilee 
Memorial Lecture of the previous year, Jagdish Bhagwati himself has cast 
doubt upon the thesis inspired by his writing of thirty years before. 
Having reviewed and called into question the conventional view, he 
presents a number of novel arguments in favour of what may be called the 
revisionist view presented in this paper, arguments to which we shall 
return later. More recently, the policy analysts Morton Halperin, Joseph 
Siegle, and Michael Weinstein, in their book The Democracy Advantage 
(2004), consider evidence for and against the conventional view, to which 
again we shall return later. 
 
Despite undercurrents in academic and policy writings, the conventional 
view still appears to hold sway in the public and journalistic spheres. It has 
been sharpened by perceptions of the different experiences of India and 
China, which, at least superficially, would appear to reinforce this view. 
China began its economic reforms earlier than India, in 1978 under Deng 
Xiaoping, whereas India began to reform in 1991 after a foreign exchange 
crisis, under circumstances which have been vividly described by the 
writer Gurcharan Das in India Unbound (2002). China’s current growth rate 
is around 10 per cent per annum, whereas India’s is around 8 per cent. The 
most striking difference shows up in foreign direct investment (FDI): last 
year, India attracted about US $6 billion of FDI, whereas China attracted 
about US $60 billion, a tenfold difference. Even recognizing that Chinese 
statistics are confounded by the problem of “round-tripping”, that is, 
investment flowing out of mainland China and returning as ostensible 
“foreign” investment to take advantage of preferential tax and regulatory 
treatment, and the fact that the majority of the “foreign” investment comes 
from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan, making its definition as 
“foreign” questionable, a large gap remains. As many economists, rightly 
or wrongly, and foreign investors, perhaps rightly, take FDI as a summary 
indicator of economic progress, this would seem to provide further 
evidence in favour of the conventional view. 
 
In a variation of the “cruel dilemma” thesis, the received wisdom that 
China will outperform India is summarized thus by Hugh Restall in the 
March 2006 issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review: “Authoritarian China 
excels at economic development because it can grasp the nettle of 
unpopular but necessary policies, while democratic India perpetually lags 
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behind because its unwieldy system makes decisive action impossible.”2 
Or, to put it more pithily, “In India everyone has a veto!”, as writer and 
politician Arun Shourie, a minister in the previous government, 
complained, at the slow pace of privatization of inefficient state-owned 
enterprises (or “disinvestment of sick public sector units”, in the Indian 
euphemism). 
 
Of course, statistics do not necessarily tell the whole story. Unfortunately, 
casual empiricism would seem to accord with this conventional view as 
well. China has built an enviable infrastructure of roads, ports, airports, 
etc., and any visitor to Shanghai is immediately impressed by the modern 
superhighway, as good or better than any in the United States or Europe, 
that leads one from the glittering new airport to the gleaming skyscrapers 
of the special economic zones and downtown in a mere half-hour. A 
visitor to Mumbai, by contrast, is confronted with a two-hour crawl from a 
creaky airport along traffic-congested, pothole-ridden roads that skirt 
some of the city’s worst shanty dwellings, until finally reaching the 
relative urbanity of the charmingly archaic colonial architecture of the city 
centre. The casual visitor might well be inclined to agree with economist 
Meghnad Desai’s (2003) dismissive claim: “China will again become a 
viable Great Power; India may become just a Great Democracy.” This 
sentiment is echoed by the Economist, which sums matters up thus in its 
much-cited comparative survey of March 5th, 2005: “A proudly democratic 
India that grows at 6% a year … should be congratulated for having 
succeeded better than a brutal anti-democratic China which grows at 10% 
a year.” This makes the trade-off inherent within the “cruel dilemma” 
explicit, by, as it were, creating a Phillips Curve between democracy and 
development, with authoritarianism “buying” the differential in growth. 
While the gap has now narrowed to about two per cent, a similar view is 
echoed by Gurcharan Das, who suggests that democracy will prevent 
India, as compared to China, from breaking into double digit growth rates. 
This, in his view, is the “cost” of democracy in India, which is a more 
sympathetic variation of the Economist’s sententious comment. 
 
More recently, there has emerged a contrarian view on this India-China 
comparison, which relates, more than tangentially, to the larger debate on 
democracy and development. In their much-cited July/August 2003 
Foreign Policy article, “Can India overtake China?”, economists Yasheng 
                                                 
2 I hasten to add that Restall does not share this view, but merely accurately summarizes it! 
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Huang and Tarun Khanna challenged the orthodoxy by arguing 
provocatively that it could. While dismissed at the time by most analysts 
of the Asian scene, their argument is finding increasing adherents, as 
evidenced by a spate of recent high-level conferences, most notably the 
March 2006 Asian Corporate Conference in Mumbai, and the Harvard 
Alumni Association’s New Delhi conference the same month, both 
featuring sessions devoted to a comparison of growth prospects in India 
and China, in which the Huang-Khanna thesis was given much credence. 
 
Superficially, as I have noted, the evidence seems to be in favour of the 
conventional view. What, then, is the thrust of the Huang-Khanna-inspired 
contrarian view? Just that what is conventionally taken as a sign of 
Chinese strength – high rates of FDI and domestic savings – are instead 
signs of weakness, of an economy with an inefficient financial system 
which cannot usefully canalize domestic savings into domestic 
entrepreneurship, and the consequent need to import capital and know-
how from abroad. Indeed, given the very high rates of investment, what is 
surprising is not how high the Chinese growth rate is, but rather how low 
it is. India, with inward investment a tenth of China, has achieved a 
growth rate in the range of 8 – 9 percent, whereas China has managed to 
squeeze only an extra percent or so of growth out of the cogs of the system 
– suggesting an incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) inefficiently high 
in China compared to India. Indeed, a recent World Bank study reports an 
ICOR in China that has risen from 3.96 in the first half of the 1980s to 5.4 in 
2002. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to claim that China’s 
economic miracle is to have become a screwdriver-turning assembly 
economy for the developed world, or the “workshop of the world”, to put 
it more politely. The label “Made in China”, ubiquitous on the shelves of 
Western shopping malls, usually means “assembled in China from 
Western technology and capital by low-wage Chinese labour”. 
 
Even more worrying for the long term is the inefficiency of the Chinese 
banking system, which is used to finance the soft budget constraints of 
state-owned enterprises. Even conservative, official estimates place the 
ratio of non-performing loans at about 25 percent of the total, but the true 
level is probably much higher, perhaps 40 percent or more. By any sensible 
standard of accounting, most Chinese banks are bankrupt. When these 
loans need to be recapitalized, the chickens may well come home to roost. 
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On the obverse side, the apparent weakness of India in attracting FDI 
reflects the strength of indigenous Indian entrepreneurship and the 
relative efficiency of the financial system, banks and the stock market alike. 
In India, growth is driven by domestic demand, and many of the new 
national champions, whether old, established business houses, such as the 
Tatas, or newcomers in the information technology field, such as Infosys, 
feature homegrown innovation and management. Such is their success, in 
fact, that they are becoming internationally recognized brand names in 
their own right, and are growing through acquisitions abroad, including in 
the developed world. A trivial but telling example might be that the Pierre, 
New York’s premier hotel, is no longer the flagship of the Canadian Four 
Seasons group but, in fact, is part of Tata’s Taj Hotels group, whose own 
flagship, the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel in Mumbai, was built as a proud 
testament to indigenous entrepreneurship over a century ago in the 
colonial era. More recently, and more importantly, Tata Steel has acquired 
Corus, a British steel manufacturer, after winning a fierce bidding war 
with other suitors, and has catapulted itself into the top echelon of world 
steel producers, yet another sign of growing Indian entrepreneurial might. 
 
These considerations might start to point the way towards an answer to 
our larger question. The repressive nature of the autocratic Chinese regime 
naturally promotes heavy investment and discourages entrepreneurship 
and innovation, whereas the chaotic nature of India’s bureaucratic 
democratic polity is manifest at the macroeconomic level of low rates of 
FDI, poor infrastructure, etc., which masks the vibrancy of 
entrepreneurship and innovation at the microeconomic level. The Huang-
Khanna-inspired contrarian view, thus, brings the democracy-
development debate in through the back door, as it were, by casting 
attention on those features of the Chinese and Indian polities which might 
create an environment conducive, or not, to economic development. 
 
This detour into the debate sparked by Huang-Khanna brings us back to 
our main theme, and conjures ideas to pursue. I suggest reasons to be 
sceptical of the “cruel dilemma” conventional view, and argue, to the 
contrary, that democracy will, in the medium to longer run, promote, 
rather, than retard, economic development, and predict that the future 
experiences of India and China may bear this out. Indeed, early warning 
signs are already present, as noted above. 
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First, though, it is necessary to sort out a potential conceptual muddle 
around the various questions that are interlinked in the debate. To ask 
which of democracy and authoritarianism better promotes development, if 
that is your goal, is to beg a logically prior question, viz., which system is 
intrinsically more inclined to promote development? The first question is 
instrumental, the latter a system-theoretic or comparative political theory 
question. Furthermore, both of these are “positive” or empirical questions 
about how we believe that the world operates. One could, and, indeed, 
should, ask a “normative” or ethical question, about which system one 
ought to pursue. On this, it is a fundamental precept of classical liberal 
theory and its successors that democracy and the system of liberties more 
generally is a political system that is intrinsically desirable in itself, not 
merely as an instrument to promote economic development. Or, to put it 
another way, achieving and sustaining a democratic polity is itself part of 
the process of development. Of course, liberal political theory would also 
suggest that economic development is in itself desirable, especially so in a 
country starting from a low level of per capita income, as it will lift 
potentially millions of people out of poverty and give them economic 
opportunities to better their own lot and that of their families. If one grants 
this, and if the “cruel dilemma” thesis holds, then this gives rise to the 
Phillips Curve-type tradeoff between democracy and development. 
 
Thus, if one wants to argue against this tradeoff, one needs to challenge 
frontally the “cruel dilemma” thesis, and thus effectively sever the 
putative empirical link between an authoritarian political regime and more 
rapid economic development. This is a far more difficult challenge, 
intellectually, than to accept, grudgingly or gleefully, the tradeoff, and 
then solemnly aver that one must accept a lower level of economic 
development as the price of political freedom, as the Economist quotation, 
implicitly if not explicitly, suggests. How, then, can one proceed?3
 
One possible avenue is to take the route of statistical and quasi-statistical 
analysis of a range of countries and time periods, to determine whether 
there is, indeed, a negative correlation (whether causal or not) between 
democracy and development. There has been some good work along these 
                                                 
3 I do not here take up the classical political science argument, articulated first by Immanuel Kant 
in the 18th century, that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other than authoritarian 
regimes, as this does not seem especially pertinent to the comparative political economy context 
of this paper. For a discussion of this Kantian argument, see, for instance, Maoz and Russett 
(1993). 
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lines, but the exemplar in this literature is the 2004 book by Halperin, 
Siegle, and Weinstein, mentioned earlier in the text. These authors find 
that democracies do better than autocracies at all stages of development, 
not merely at the level of the already rich industrial economies. This 
certainly casts doubt upon the conventional view, but this statistically 
driven approach must be supplemented by a more nuanced consideration 
of arguments based on specific causal mechanisms and a careful 
consideration of cases, which in our particular case are the comparative 
political economy of India and China. We turn next to this task. 
 
One line of reasoning, attractive to this author, rests on the classical liberal 
dictum, best enunciated in the last century by Friedrich von Hayek and 
Milton Friedman, that economic freedom and political freedom are 
inextricably linked. One cannot have one, without the other, for very long, 
without getting into a crisis. At one level, this can be read merely as a gloss 
on the normative liberal view, and an instance, perhaps, of the liberal 
fallacy, “that all good things go together”, in this case, democracy and 
development. At another level, it may be read as an empirical claim that a 
free market will eventually create pressures within a society that will lead 
to a political freeing up. As Ralph Harris, founder of the Institute of 
Economic Affairs and an original member of the Mont Pelerin Society, puts 
it in an interview in 2000: “It wasn't a theoretical thing; it was an active 
thing, that drive for democracy, for freedom. The argument always was 
that democracy is impossible without a free economy. [That] you need a 
free economy was a necessary though not a sufficient condition of 
democracy.” This economic libertarian thesis also relates to another strand 
of literature, from political science, which argues that economic 
development will eventually create a push from within societies for 
political freedom. The experience of the now rich industrial countries 
shows exactly this experience during the course of the 19th century. To 
perhaps oversimplify it, the rise of the new manufacturing and commercial 
class, as a direct byproduct of modern industrial economic development, 
led to new claims for political liberty and freedom from this now risen 
bourgeoisie, which led to democratization through several stages, 
culminating in universal suffrage, free elections, free press, and protection 
of other civil liberties, a process that carried through the 19th into the 20th 
century. We have witnessed the same process, in a temporally compressed 
fashion, in the rise of democracy in South Korea and in several Latin 
American countries, including, most notably, Chile, which made a 
transition from market reforms under the brutal and repressive military 
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regime of Augusto Pinochet to today a stable multiparty democracy and 
one of the most successful economies in the region. 
 
On this view, then, China’s pursuit of a free market, without a free society, 
sets up contradictory forces that will eventually lead, either to 
democratization, perhaps slow and painful, perhaps accelerated, or, 
equally possible, a sudden political implosion, which will, obviously, set 
back economic development. The fact that there are a large and growing 
number of political demonstrations every year (about 75,000 officially 
reported last year) is presumably a concern to the regime, and suggests 
that fear of a popular uprising against the Communist Party’s monopoly 
on political power is, while still remote, not entirely fanciful. Equally 
worrying is the increasing gap between the new rich, concentrated in 
urban agglomerations mainly in the coastal areas, and the rural poor, 
especially in the remote hinterlands of the interior. This shows up as an 
increase in income inequality in China, however measured. The simplest 
measure is the Gini coefficient, which takes values ranging from 0 (perfect 
equality) to 100 (perfect inequality). Calculations show that the Gini 
coefficient in China has been rising and is in the range of 45 or higher. In 
India, by contrast, it has actually been coming down as a result of 
economic reforms, and is around 33 or so. (For comparison, it is about 40 
in the United States, slightly lower in the United Kingdom and Canada, 
and about 60 in Brazil.) 
 
While those who have been the beneficiaries of economic reform in China 
are evidently content to live without political liberty and acquiesce in the 
Communist Party’s strategy of economic reform without political reform, 
what of those who have been left behind? They cannot express their 
discontent publicly, but the simmering frustrations may at some point boil 
over and threaten the stability of the regime. It might be argued that 
exactly this occurred during the protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989, and 
that the regime was able to contain the situation. Indeed they were on that 
occasion, but those protests were led by a relatively small number of urban 
students and activists. It is not clear how the regime would react to a mass 
uprising by the rural peasantry, and whether its repressive tactics would 
succeed, or whether the country would descend into chaos. 
 
This possibility relates to one set of arguments that have been made 
recently against the conventional view and in favour of the contrarian 
view espoused in this paper, known as the “safety valve” vs. “bottling 
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up”. To quote Bhagwati (1995, p. 7) from his Rajiv Gandhi lecture: “… 
authoritarian regimes ‘bottle up’ problems while democracies permit 
catharsis, the apparent chaos of democracy in fact constituting a safety 
value that strengthens, instead of undermining, the state and provides the 
ultimate stability that is conducive to development.” On this view, then, 
the repressed opposition to the Chinese Communist regime, at present 
muted and muzzled, or “bottled up”, may indeed burst out of the bottle 
and threaten to bring down the whole edifice (to mix metaphors with some 
poetic license). Again to quote Bhagwati (1995, p. 9): “The instinct and the 
practice of authoritarian regimes … is to repress, to bottle up, these 
conflicts, building towards eventual eruption when the pressures have 
built up to an explosive level.” This is precisely the fear in the case of 
China. 
 
The obverse of this argument, of course, is that, in India’s case, democracy 
serves as a “safety valve”, through which actual or putative losers of 
reform can make their voices heard, whose manifest appearance is 
superficial chaos but whose latent reality is deep-seated stability. This 
safety value operates through the democratic “trinity” of free and fair 
regular elections, an independent judiciary, and a free press (and free 
expression more generally), all conspicuous by their absence in varying 
degrees in “hard” or “soft” authoritarian regimes. This deliberative, 
democratic process is particularly striking in India, in which there is a 
long-standing culture of public argument and debate. This, indeed, is the 
central thesis of economist and philosopher Amartya Sen’s 2005 book, The 
Argumentative Indian. This deliberative and argumentative ethos may often 
appear, especially to outsider observers, as a paralyzing state of confusion, 
but it is merely, again to quote Bhagwati, “the robust noise of a 
functioning democracy”. He elaborates further: “Its chief virtue is that 
where different groups … jostle for voice and representation, it provides a 
platform for the contest and an airing of the demands, yielding a catharsis 
if not the satisfaction that success brings and thus acting as a safety valve.” 
(Bhagwati, 1995, p. 9.) 
 
Let us consider this “safety valve” argument further in the case of India, 
considering the three primary elements of democracy that we have 
identified. We shall turn to elections in a moment. Consider first an 
independent judiciary and a free press. Both of these are very much in 
evidence in contemporary India. The judiciary, especially the Supreme 
Court, has become increasingly activist, particularly through public 
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interest litigation (PIL). A new avenue is the Right to Information Act 
(RTI), which allows individuals to bring civil servants to account for failing 
to live up to their obligations. These are coupled with an especially 
vigorous and active press, both the traditional media of print and 
television, and increasingly the internet, which bring to light government 
failings and in which there is constant debate on all matters political, 
social, and cultural. This stands in sharp contrast to the Chinese case, in 
which political discourse is entirely absent from the permitted media and 
in which any hint of criticism of the regime in the press or public sphere is 
punishable by arrest or other severe sanctions. 
 
More subtly, but equally importantly, the fact that India is pluralistic as 
well as democratic gives social, cultural, and political space to ethnic and 
religious minorities, who are able to cultivate their identities within the 
context of plural national identities, to borrow a phrase from Amartya Sen 
(2006), and hence need not resort to violence nor succumb to 
fundamentalism, both of which, it goes without saying, are as destabilizing 
to economic possibilities as they are corrosive of the body politic. Notably, 
Islamic fundamentalism is not widespread in India, unlike in 
neighbouring, non-democratic Pakistan or in some of the autocratic 
regimes of the Middle East, and it would be difficult to deny that 
democracy plays an important part in this difference. 
 
I turn now to what may be the lynchpin of democracy, viz., elections. India 
has a history of unbroken free and fair elections starting with 
independence from British colonial rule in 1947 and the establishment of 
the Indian republic in 1950 up until the present day, even including the 
period immediately following emergency rule by Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi from 1975 – 1977. Indeed, in the 1977 election, which boiled down 
to a contest between the Indian National Congress Party led by Mrs. 
Gandhi and the Janata Party led by Morarji Desai, the opposition 
campaigned on the platform that the country faced a choice between 
“democracy and dictatorship”. In the ensuing election, the Congress was 
defeated, and, to the great surprise of many, mostly Western, observers, 
Mrs. Gandhi respected the election results and resigned. This was a crucial 
test of Indian democracy, which it passed with flying colours. A much 
earlier test, of course, in the immediate aftermath of independence, was 
whether India would remain democratic or degenerate into a military 
dictatorship, as quickly happened in Pakistan. Echoing the “Orientalism” 
(in the sense of the late Edward W. Said) of John Stuart Mill, amongst 
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others, Winston Churchill famously predicted that Indians would not be 
able to govern themselves and that the country would collapse after the 
end of colonial rule. Fortunately, he lived long enough to see his prediction 
fail. 
 
Our concern, here, however, is not so much with the historical record of 
Indian elections, but with the question of whether democracy, and in 
particular the conduct of elections, has helped or hampered economic 
development in India. For this question, by far the most interesting case 
study is the 2004 general election, in which a government which 
campaigned on the success of economic reform was defeated by an 
opposition whose election platform appealed to those who had been left 
out. This raises the obvious and important question, whether it could be 
considered a vote against further economic reform by those left out, 
especially the rural poor, or whether merely an anti-incumbency vote, 
which is another long-time feature of Indian politics.4 I conclude, after 
sifting the evidence, that there is, indeed, a case that the defeat of the BJP-
led NDA government and the electoral success of the Congress-led UPA 
government rested on the former’s triumphalist “India Shining” campaign 
and the latter’s appeal to “aam admi” (the common man), more on which 
below. 
 
To give the background: In the lead-up to the election, the economy was 
booming, and a confident Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (which headed the 
National Democratic Alliance or NDA coalition), campaigned, certain of 
victory, with the triumphalist election slogan, “India Shining”.5 Everyone, 
including the Indian National Congress Party, then in opposition, expected 
an easy re-election victory for the BJP. Even senior Congressmen sat the 
election out, so certain were they of the outcome. The pressing question for 
the Congress was: on what basis would they contest the election? Taking a 
bold gamble, and borrowing a leaf from the old playbook, the Congress 
Party’s senior political strategists, led by Jairam Ramesh, amongst others, 
crafted an election strategy aimed at the rural masses, who had been left 
out of the economic boom, centred mainly in the major metropolitan areas. 
                                                 
4 As an aside, India is perhaps unique amongst the major democracies in having an in-built anti-
incumbency bias in general elections, i.e., being an incumbent reduces a candidate’s probability 
of re-election, ceteris paribus. This is in sharp contrast to the prevalent pattern in Western 
countries, in which is there an incumbency advantage. 
5 This was the brainchild of the late Pramod Mahajan, senior BJP political strategist in the 2004 
election, who also received much of the blame, ex post facto, for the election defeat. 
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The campaign slogan was: “Congress Ka Haath Aam Admi Ke Saath,” 
which translates loosely as: “Congress Walks Hand in Hand with the 
Common Man.” This was also a clever play on the Congress’ election 
symbol, the hand.6 As charismatically delivered by the party’s leader, 
Sonia Gandhi, the campaign message, that economic growth must engage 
and embrace those who had been left out, largely the downtrodden and 
lower caste rural population, and not just further enrich the existing upper 
caste urban elite, struck a resonant chord. It is also struck a blindspot of the 
BJP, whose political base was mainly the very upper caste urban elite who 
were the prime beneficiaries of the economic liberalization. 
 
The election results were stunning, not least for the Congress: they were 
swept back into power, and the BJP were out. “India Shining” had badly 
backfired. The new coalition, called the United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA), headed by the Congress, embedded the winning campaign 
platform in the National Common Minimum Programme (NCMP), 
authored by, amongst others, Jairam Ramesh, and overseen by a National 
Advisory Council (NAC) reporting to the Prime Minister. 
 
The election results raise a number of pertinent questions. First, was it, 
indeed, the difference in the campaign messages of the two main parties 
that led to the election result? And, second, has reform slowed down or 
even stalled, due to the populist hue of the platform to which the current 
government is tied as enshrined in the NCMP? If the answer to one or both 
questions is “yes”, and economic growth tapers off due to a failure to push 
forward the reform agenda, this could be a return of the “cruel dilemma” 
thesis, albeit in refined and muted form, and a vindication, perhaps, of 
Das’ contention that democracy will keep India below double digit growth 
of aggregate income. 
 
In answer to the first question, there is no consensus amongst the many 
economists, political scientists, policy analysts, journalists, and others who 
have studied and opined on the 2004 general election. Amongst the many 
scholarly and popular writings on the subject, two of the best scholarly 
works are essays by political scientists E. Sridharan (2004) and Ashutosh 
Varshney (2006). Sridharan’s findings reinforce the widely-held perception 
that the BJP’s political base is largely amongst the urban upper caste 
                                                 
6 See Exhibit 1 at the end of the paper for a reproduction of one of the campaign posters, taken 
from the 2004 election manifesto, incorporating these features. 
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Hindus, who are beneficiaries of economic reform, whereas the Congress 
draws support largely from the rural backward castes and minorities, who 
have not seen very much of the fruits of economic reform to date. 
Varshney’s results are in accord with this finding. Of course, it is not 
possible to leap from this to the conclusion that the 2004 election results 
hinged on economic reform, a conclusion that Varshney believes cannot 
conclusively be drawn from the data available. To quote him (Varshney, 
2006, p. 15): “We have … noted that the masses have developed negative 
views about those who benefited from reforms. Those who thought the 
rich benefited may have … voted disproportionately against the NDA, but 
did they do so for that reason?” He goes on to argue that the development 
of a system of alliances as between the two major parties and various 
smaller and regional parties in alliance with each of them, coupled with a 
general anti-incumbency bias in Indian politics noted before, confutes the 
tempting conclusion that voters turned against the NDA because of 
economic reforms. His conclusion instead is (Varshney, 2006, p. 17): “First, 
India’s plebian orders have begun to resent the elite-serving nature of 
economic reforms in India. Second, their resentment against reforms has 
not yet become the principal basis of their voting choices.” Having said 
that, even if it is not true that the BJP lost and the Congress won primarily 
because of economic reforms, the fact that the Congress campaigned on a 
slogan to help the “aam admi”, as against the BJP’s “India Shining”, and 
the general perception that attitudes toward economic reform played a 
role in the election results, probably in themselves act as a political 
constraint on the Congress-led UPA government: in politics, perception 
often becomes reality. Thus, the spectre of the refined “cruel dilemma” 
thesis still needs to be tackled, and we must turn to our second question, as 
to whether the newly elected UPA government has been, either by choice 
or by political compulsion, slowing down the pace of economic reform, if 
not stalling it altogether. 
 
On this second question, there is certainly the perception that this, indeed, 
has been the case, as we stand well past the midway point of the mandate 
of the current government. What fuels this perception is in large part the 
fact that the UPA relies upon the Left Front parties for its electoral survival 
in the Lok Sabha. The UPA has 222 parliamentary seats, whereas it would 
need 273 for an outright majority. The Left parties have 61 seats. The Left 
supports the government “from the outside”, i.e., they are not part of the 
UPA. If they withdraw their support, the government will fall. They are 
thus what political scientists call a “veto player”. The DMK (Tamil Nadu), 
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the second largest in the UPA coalition after the Congress itself, is also a 
veto player. Indeed, in 2006, the DMK did block a disinvestment of part of 
the central government’s holdings in two public sector unit in Tamil Nadu, 
NALCO and NLC. The previous year, under threat from the Left parties, 
the government reversed a decision to disinvest 10 per cent of its shares in 
the public sector until, BHEL. After these policy reversals, the Prime 
Minister, Manmohan Singh, announced that all disinvestment decisions 
would be placed “on hold”. On another front, the government is moving 
forward very gingerly on the creation of special economic zones (SEZs), 
once again given protests from the Left parties and of various grassroots 
political activists, although here the economic arguments in their favour is 
less clear-cut, and has not attempted a large scale reform of labour laws, 
which, at present, make it difficult to fire workers, and hence retard 
employment growth. To quote Varshney (2006, p. 17): “Hence the oft-
heard claim in the press that privatization, reform of labor laws, 
elimination of agricultural subsidies and further dismantling of the small 
[scale] sector will not go forward until the government’s dependence on 
the left ends.” This begs the further question: why has the Congress not 
pressed the Left more vigorously? If the Left were to bring down the UPA 
government, the likely result in a new election would be a strengthening of 
the BJP, which would, almost surely, be more detrimental to the Left than 
to the Congress. This leaves unanswered why the Congress concedes, 
rather than challenges, its Left allies. Varshney’s persuasive hypothesis is: 
“The Congress has not called the left’s bluff, because Congress party 
strategists have independently come to the conclusion that the party’s 
social base requires a programmatic focus on the lower and middle 
echelons of society.” (Varshney, 2006, p. 18) 
 
There is certainly evidence that one may adduce in favor of Varshney’s 
thesis of the Congress’ political re-orientation. The current UPA 
government has a veritable “dream team” of economic reformers and 
technocrats in its ranks, including, of course, the Prime Minister himself, 
Manmohan Singh, who was the architect of the original 1991 reforms that 
jumpstarted the Indian economy; P. Chidambaram, Minister of Finance; 
Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission; 
Jairam Ramesh, one of the architects of the Congress victory and the 
NCMP, and now Minister of State for Commerce; and Mani Shankar 
Aiyar, originally Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, and now 
Minister in charge, amongst other things, of Panchayati Raj, and himself a 
former diplomat, and later speechwriter to Rajiv Gandhi during the 1980s. 
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But the emphasis, at least rhetorical, has been on flagship initiatives such 
as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (NREGP) and 
on increased reservations for backward castes in higher education and in 
the private sector, and not on pushing forward the economic reform 
agenda, which is as yet incomplete. 
 
Varshney has some additional shrewd observations on the implications of 
this for the Congress Party’s political strategy, which deserve to be quoted 
in full: “The Congress Party’s new social base begins to explain the UPA’s 
new moves towards rural employment guarantee and affirmative action. 
Indeed, two ideas, never explicitly articulated by the party but well 
understood in political circles, have driven this strategy. First, the upper 
segments at best constitute no more than 25 – 30 per cent of India’s 
population. After the kind of support they have provided the BJP over the 
last ten years, getting them back in the older Congress umbrella is harder 
than consolidating gains in the middle and lower segments. The upper 
segments are also less attractive because the number of votes in the middle 
and lower segments is much higher. Moreover, the middle and lower 
segments tend to have higher turn-out rates. Thus, in the pure arithmetic 
of vote, unless they regroup and begin to participate in elections more, the 
upper segments of Indian society are dwindling as a power base in 
electoral politics. Their control over the press, especially the English-
language press, means that they can still generate a vigorous debate in the 
country, strengthening the public sphere of democracy. But their election 
participation is lower than the national average, making them less than 
fully consequential in electoral politics.” (Varshney, 2006, pp. 19 – 20).7
 
Varshney’s observation echoes a prescient remark by writer and politician 
Mani Shankar Aiyar, who wrote in 2003, while then in opposition: 
“Reformers of an academic mould tend to underplay the economic 
significance of the political fact that the votes of the poor and the backward 
regions far outweigh the votes of the rich and the relatively advanced 
areas….Until we go back to the ethic of Daridranarayana and the wiping 
of every tear from every eye, reforms will remain an elitist preoccupation 
with an elitist bias.” (Aiyar, 2003, pp. 17 – 19) It is exactly the intuition of 
this political reality that guided the Congress back into power in 2004. 
                                                 
7 It is noteworthy that, as with the effect of incumbency, differential turnout rates in India 
amongst the various socioeconomic strata do not follow the pattern in Western democracies: in 
India, one is more likely to vote if poor, ceteris paribus; the opposite being the case, for instance, 
in the United States. 
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In light of these considerations, should we conclude that economic 
reforms, and hence further economic development, has, indeed, stalled 
under the current Indian government, whereas Chinese reforms and 
growth evidently proceed apace, hence giving credence to the “cruel 
dilemma” thesis in its muted form? I believe that this conclusion would be 
premature, for a number of different reasons. First, despite the rhetorical 
change in the Congress’ position vis-à-vis its predecessor BJP government, 
there has been very little actual change in government policy, and certainly 
no attempt to roll back any of the elements of the economic reforms 
implemented by previous governments going back to 1991.8 Economic 
growth continues to be robust, and models deployed by the Planning 
Commission predict a status quo or “base case” growth rate of aggregate 
income on the order of 8 – 9 per cent per annum, only slightly lower than 
the Chinese growth rate.9 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the 
Congress finally shows signs of doing what no previous Indian 
government has done, including the 1991 reformist government, which is 
to “sell” reforms to the Indian electorate. The failure to do so, and the 
management of reform as a largely technocratic enterprise, almost, as it 
were, by stealth, is one of the reasons attributed by Gurcharan Das, 
amongst others, for the lack of a popular political consensus on the merits 
of economic reform, and hence its apparent political fragility in India. 
Recently, however, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has been giving 
speeches, in India and abroad, espousing the concept of “inclusive 
globalization”, a term, evidently, which refers to market-oriented and 
outward-looking economic reforms which nonetheless are socially 
responsible and are concerned with the plight of those disadvantaged 
members of society who have not shared in the fruits of economic growth 
to date. This new concept is also evident in the approach paper to the 11th 
Five Year Plan, entitled “Towards Faster and More Inclusive Growth”. It is 
                                                 
8 There is an interesting recent debate on whether it is correct to date the economic liberalization 
in India to 1991, which is the orthodox view, held by Bhagwati amongst others. A revisionist 
view, propounded by economist Dani Rodrik, amongst others, argues that one must look earlier, 
to the Rajiv Gandhi era in the 1980s, when important changes in mindset took place that made 
the 1991 reforms possible, so that it would be more accurate to date the reforms as originating 
with the induction of Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister in late 1984. 
9 Consider the following illustrative “back of the envelope” calculation: an investment rate of 35 
percent (approximately the current one) and an ICOR of 4 gives a growth rate of 8.75 percent. 
Perhaps coincidentally, this would also correspond to the “golden” rule savings/investment rate 
a la Phelps, in which the optimal savings rate is approximately equal to the economy’s share of 
capital of national income. 
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instantiated in the 2007 Union Budget, which, for the first time, shows 
signs of implementing what might be called “social policy”, by directing 
exponentially increased public funds to health and education. If this 
concept takes hold in the public consciousness, it might succeed in creating 
what Jairam Ramesh has termed a “politically durable consensus” around 
further economic reforms, which, obviously, is a political necessity for the 
economic reform agenda to be carried forward by the current, or indeed a 
successor, government. Another positive recent sign is that Oscar 
Fernandes, a senior Congress leader, who was serving as Minister of State 
without portfolio, was given independent charge of the Ministry of Labour 
in a cabinet reshuffle in late 2006, with a mandate to begin discussions 
with relevant stakeholders on putative labour law reforms in the context of 
the special economic zones (SEZs), a key element of the gradualist reform 
agenda that I sketch below. But it is still too early to tell if Fernandes’ 
political weight will give the government sufficient traction on this issue 
within the remaining lifespan of its mandate. 
 
Evidently, the jury is as yet out on whether the current Indian government 
succeeds in pushing forward the agenda of economic reform, and hence on 
whether it avoids succumbing to the “cruel dilemma”. At some level, this 
is not surprising, since the government is only a little more than halfway 
through its five year mandate.  But, as I have just noted, there are some 
reasons to be optimistic, despite the more obvious and visible reasons to be 
pessimistic, that Varshney and others have pointed out.10 In the sequel, I 
make some policy recommendations, on how the current, or a successor, 
Indian government could push forward the reform of economic agenda, in 
a manner which is electorally feasible, and which accords with Ramesh’s 
concept of a “politically durable consensus” around further reforms. The 
success of such an agenda would ensure that the “cruel dilemma” thesis is 
confounded, and that democracy and development can be friends, rather 
than foes. 
 
To conclude, I argue that the pursuit of a more gradual and nuanced 
approach to further reforms, so-called “second” and “third” generation 
reforms, such as labour law reform, disinvestment, financial sector reform, 
removal of agricultural subsidies, investment in primary education and 
primary health care, etc., can be crafted in a manner to be politically 
                                                 
10 I should note that Varshney (2007) strikes an optimistic note in keeping with the general tenor 
of the present piece. 
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feasible, under the twin rubrics of “inclusive liberalization”, a modification 
of Manmohan Singh’s term, and “optimal globalization”, a concept that 
economist James Dean and I have previously developed (Dean, Dehejia, et 
al., 2004). These would attempt to strike a balance between growth and 
equity that had, perhaps, been forgotten in the early heady days of 
economic liberalization, and make this more tempered reform strategy, 
including further reforms, politically more palatable to a larger majority. In 
the bargain, India is on track to maintain a growth rate of 8 percent, 
accelerating perhaps to 10 percent, in the coming years, as necessary 
investments in infrastructure, both physical and social, begin to yield 
dividends. Interestingly, the very recently published Goldman Sachs 
report on India claims that under “status quo” policies and fairly 
conservative assumptions India is poised to grow at 8 percent per annum, 
and suggests that 10 percent growth is possible if a number of conditions, 
such as a higher investment rate, are met. This is entirely consistent with 
the generally optimistic epistle presented here. 
 
The challenge of “growth with equity” is especially critical in the context 
of a still largely poor, democratic polity, such as India, in which the 
political centre of gravity is, perforce, to the left. As sociologist and 
politician Jorge Casteneda (2006, p. 30) puts it: “The combination of 
inequality and democracy tends to cause a movement to the left 
everywhere.” This is the question of the moment in India, as it is in other 
large and democratic emerging economies, such as Brazil, Mexico, or 
South Africa, in which the imperative is to build a “politically durable 
consensus” around such next generation reforms. Avenues that would 
make this possible include, inter alia, gradualist and sequenced reforms 
centred around public-private partnerships (PPPs), especially in the 
infrastructure sector, selective expansion of special economic zones (SEZs) 
on non-agricultural land, income support to farmers to replace protection 
lost through trade and subsidy liberalization, incremental labour law 
reform (initially in the context of SEZs) and, perhaps most importantly, 
firmly establishing in the public eye the trade-employment link by 
promoting and nurturing small-scale producers in selected exportable 
sectors in underprivileged regions. If these succeed in allowing reforms to 
proceed, incrementally if not apace, this will keep the spectre of the “cruel 
dilemma” at bay, at least for the moment. This is, perforce, a narrative, as 
yet unfinished, rather than a clinching analytical argument, such is the 
nature of ephemeral social, including economic, phenomena, and it may 
yet be overturned by future events. But even then it is suggestive evidence 
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in support of my central thesis, that, democracy, far from being a 
hindrance, is a handmaiden, of economic development, at least in the 
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Exhibit 1: Indian National Congress Party election manifesto in the 2004 
general election. 
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